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A PEEK INTO PANDORA'S BOX: FOLDING 
CARTON AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION IN CIVIL ANTITRUST ACTIONS 
The proliferation of antitrust actions in the private sector• and 
the escalation of criminal penalties in the government's enforce-
ment of antitrust legislation2 have expanded the risks which an-
titrust violators face. Concomitantly, the detrimental effects of 
any ambiguities in federal procedure in antitrust cases have be-
come more severe. Moreover, the judiciary must be concerned 
with the problems and policies of both criminal and civil actions 
at once since an antitrust violation may result in both criminal 
and civil liability.3 Consistent procedural safeguards to ensure a 
fair and expeditious resolution in both actions should be sought 
and procedural conflicts between civil and criminal antitrust ac-
1 For statistical evidence of their growth, see, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 769 (1977); 
Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365, 371-73 (1970); 
Nolo Contendere and. Private Antitrust Enforcement, Hearings on S. 2512 Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 180-324 (1966). 
• For example, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976); has been amended to in-
crease maximum individual criminal penalties to a $100,000 fine or three years in prison 
or both. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), as amended by Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1973). The effect of a statutory expansion of the anti-
trust penalties historically has been an increase in the fines imposed. See Posner, supra 
note 1, at 390-94. See also U.S. Dept. of Justice Guidelines for Sentencing Recommenda-
tions in Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act, reprinted in 803 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. 
REP. (BNA) F-1 (1977). 
• Concurrent civil and criminal proceedings against antitrust violators are possible in a 
variety of situations. Criminal prosecutions and government injunction suits to restrain 
violations may be brought simultaneously. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
226 U.S. 20 (1912). The Sherman Act permits civil and criminal actions to be brought 
simultaneously. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); United States v. J.M. Huber 
Corp., 179 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). A suit for an injunction against future actions 
does not preclude a simultaneous suit for past damages. See United States v. Oregon 
State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952). Government injunction actions and pri-
vate treble-damage suits may be brought simultaneously under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 15 (1976). United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954). 
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tions must be resolved. 
Determining the appropriate parameters of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination in antitrust litigation 
presents particularly acute problems of conflict and ambiguity .4 
In a recent large antitrust case, In re Folding Carton Antitrust 
Litigation5 (Folding Carton), the court considered directly the 
extent of a non-corporate civil antitrust defendant's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The dilemma 
for the defendant in Folding Carton was his choice between re-
fusing to testify at all in the civil case about his involvement in 
alleged criminal activities, thereby risking civil contempt, or tes-
tifying about his activity and facing possible subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution based on his testimony. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the dimensions of an 
individual's Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil antitrust ac-
• The Fifth Amendment provides: "No ... person shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The scope of the privilege 
has been the subject of a great deal of commentary. See, e.g., Friendly, The Fifth 
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitµtional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 
(1968); Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's 
Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1977); Comment, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1967); Comment, Federal Discovery in Concurrent 
Criminal and Civil Proceedings, 52 TUL. L. REv. 769 (1978). 
Several recent federal cases have considered the permissibility of an assertion of Fifth 
Amendment privilege in civil antitrust discovery proceedings. In re Anthracite Coal Anti-
trust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Pa. 1979), concerned a civil antitrust action against 
coal producers for price-fixing in the coal industry. The court granted a plaintiff's motion 
to sanction for failure of the corporate defendant to comply with a discovery order even 
though corporate officers invoked the Fifth Amendment. The court also held that sanc-
tions could be imposed despite an economic impact on those who invoked the privilege. 
Id. at 369. Since a corporation has no privilege under the Fifth Amendment, Curcio v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957), the corporate defendant in Anthracite Coal was pre-
cluded from raising the complaint that the discovery order had an adverse impact on the 
officers who held an economic interest in the corporation. The court concluded: 
[w]ere the court to rule otherwise, it would be giving the Defendant corporations 
the benefit of a Fifth Amendment privilege where none exists. It is well settled 
that a corporation does not enjoy the right not to incriminate itself . . . . Al-
though imposing a sanction pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 37(b) on the corporations 
may have some economic impact upon the officers of those corporations who 
have invoked the Fifth Amendment, because of the corporation's lack of a Fifth 
Amendment privilege it cannot be heard about that result. 
F.R.D. at 368-69. Thus, the court held that civil sanctions may be imposed on a 
corporation. 
In Flavorland Industries, Inc. v. United States, 591 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1979), the court 
considered a similar problem on the criminal side of antitrust litigation. A federal grand 
jury subpoenaed a corporation for discovery materials consisting of depositions of corpo-
rate employees gathered in a private antitrust action. The court held that the corporation 
had no standing to assert the Fourth and Fifth Amendment privileges of its employees, 
and compelled it to produce the discovery materials and evidence. Id. at 525. See also In 
re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). 
' 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'g 465 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
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tion where the person has not yet been guaranteed that criminal 
prosecution is no longer possible. Two issues are apparent: first, 
under what conditions may a civil antitrust defendant properly 
invoke the privilege; second, if a civil antitrust plaintiff seeks to 
discover information privileged under the Fifth Amendment, 
what is the proper response to the problem? Folding Carton pro-
vides an excellent example of the process of antitrust litigation 
and demonstrates the tensions involved. Using that case as an 
example, the article examines the competing interests and ana-
lyzes the various standards for protection under the Fifth 
Amendment in an antitrust action. Finally, the article suggests 
the proper rule for invocation of the privilege: Fifth Amendment 
rights of a civil antitrust defendant should prevail if immunity is 
absent and if any criminal prosecution is still possible. The pro-
posal that an exclusionary rule be used rather than the privilege 
is shown to be an unsatisfactory solution because it would pro-
vide inadequate protection of an individual's Fifth Amendment 
rights by compromising the privilege. 
I. VALUES To BE BALANCED 
Enforcement of the federal antitrust laws through the use of 
criminal sanctions8 and both types of private damage actions7 
has become the primary legal method of fostering competitive 
behavior in the American economy. The purpose of private anti-
trust litigation is not limited to compensation of those directly 
injured.8 Congress has encouraged private action in order to pro-
' Criminal sanctions are provided under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976); 
Wilson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976); and Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). For an individual defendant, penalties under the 
antitrust laws are set with the court's discretion and may be as much as three years 
incarceration and a $100,000 fine. See note 2 supra. 
' For example, the Department of Justice may secure an injunction against violation of 
the antitrust laws and may seek damages for injury to its business or property. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15(a) (1976). 
A private plaintiff may secure treble damages or injunctions for violations of the fed-
eral antitrust laws. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 
1976), in which the court examined the broad scope of equitable remedies under the anti-
trust laws. 
• The functions of antitrust laws are diverse. Section 4 of the Clayton Act is intended 
to be remedial in character. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 
(1977); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977). Private 
remedies are intended to encourage private individuals to bring antitrust actions in the 
public interest. Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc. 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 900 (1964); Mach-tronics v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963). Another often-
expressed goal is to multiply the number of agencies which could effectively enforce anti-
trust laws. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963). The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized both a deterrence and a remedial purpose in the antitrust 
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tect the public interest in free competition.9 The theory is that if 
a multiplicity of potential litigants can bring actions under fed-
eral antitrust laws, possible violators will be deterred by the 
greater likelihood of a court challenge, and consequently, by the 
prospect of the enormous financial costs and damaging criminal 
exposure which might develop. 
Conflicting values arise, however, when both criminal and civil 
actions may be directed at the same individual. Procedural and 
evidentiary requirements are different in criminal and civil ac-
tions, 10 and adjustments must be made to accommodate the 
stricter constitutional requirements of criminal proceedings. For 
example, if a civil plaintiff moves under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) to compel deposition testimony of a wit-
ness in a civil antitrust action, 11 the issue is what evidence may 
be sought and how it should be treated in subsequent criminal 
actions. A determination of the parameters of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination requires one to consider 
the disparate values, the proper standard, the possible legal re-
sponses, and the relative merits of the alternative policies. 
Without a provision of statutory immunity, 12 the problems of 
the conflicting needs of civil and criminal actions become appar-
ent. On the one hand, in civil antitrust litigation, the defense 
tactic of cloaking evidence behind the threat of potential crimi-
nal prosecution could hinder the full development of the plain-
tiff's case. The defendants would refuse to produce evidence on 
the theoretical or speculative possibility of criminal prosecution. 
Efficient civil discovery could thus be constrained whenever any 
prosecutor still had the power to bring a criminal action against 
the witness. The protection of the Fifth Amendment could, 
therefore, allow essential testimony to be withheld, thus bringing 
laws. Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 
431 U.S. 720, 746 (1976). 
• The purpose of antitrust legislation has been the subject of much discussion and ar-
gument. See, e.g., H. THoRELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); Austin, The 
Emergence of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1972); Bork, Legislative Intent 
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J .L. & EcoN. 7 (1966); Elzinga, The Goals of Anti-
trust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 
1191 (1977). Of primary importance is the encouragement of competition and efficiency. 
See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 
U.S. 231 (1956); Hearings on S. 2028 Before Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1975-76) (statement of Thomas 
E. Kauper). 
•• See generally Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrim-
ination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 121 (1972); 
Ritchie, supra note 4. 
11 The civil plaintiffs action would be governed by FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2). 
11 See note 20 infra. 
WINTER 1980] Self-Incrimination 439 
to a halt any antitrust litigation in which criminal liability is 
still possible. 13 Expeditious and fair civil antitrust litigation calls 
for a narrow circumscription of the ability of a deposed witness 
to avoid providing testimony. 
On the other hand, a broad privilege against self-incrimination 
is necessary to prote_ct the individual in possible criminal prose-
cution. The Fifth Amendment was intended to permit the indi-
vidual to avoid revealing information that could aid the govern-
ment in its prosecution." The privilege can be invoked whenever 
the threat of self-incrimination in a. criminal prosecution may 
arise. If the government is to prosecute an individual success-
fully, it must be able to do so without the use of compelled testi-
mony from the defendant. 
The theory is that the defendant should not be required to 
face the trilemma of self-incrimination, committing perjury, or 
facing judicial sanction in the form of civil contempt. The 
United States Supreme Court has forthrightly declared that 
"[t]he privilege [against self-incrimination] is not ordinarily de-
pendent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testi-
mony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and crim-
inal proceedings, whenever the answer might tend to subject to 
criminal responsibility him who gives it. " 15 The need for balanc-
ing values is clear: complete discovery of the evidence for the 
civil action requires a narrow interpretation of the privilege, 
whereas protection of individual constitutional rights regarding 
13 The district court in Folding Carton predicated its denial of Fifth Amendment pro-
tection on a policy argument: 
Finally, strong policy considerations support the result reached here. Federal 
and state criminal statutes have an expansive and omnipresent sweep in modern 
society. There are a multitude of situations where potential criminal and civil 
liability overlap. Sustaining a civil witness' refusal to testify every time an an-
swer might give rise to some theoretically possible future criminal prosecution, 
no matter how remote, would signal a virtual end to discovery in civil cases. 
Assertions of the fifth amendment which, as a practical matter, are frivolous 
should not be allowed to frustrate discovery in civil cases. 
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 465 F. Supp. 618, 625 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 609 
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). 
" The privilege against self-incrimination stemmed from a tradition of accused persons 
refusing to testify in the English Star Chamber. For an examination of the historical 
developments and policies of the privilege, see 8 J. WmMORE, EvmENCE §§ 2250-51 (Mc-
Naughton Rev. 1961); Friendly, supra note 4, at 677-98; Kaminsky, supra note 10; Mc-
Naughton, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination; Its Constitutional, Raison d'Entre 
and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 138 (1960); Morgan, The Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949); Pitman, The Colonial and 
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. 
REv. 763 (1935). 
15 McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 
511 (1967); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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possible criininal prosecution requires a broad interpretation of 
the privilege. 
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Folding Carton 
In 1976, a Department of Justice investigation of the folding 
carton industry resulted in the criminal indictment of twenty-
three folding carton producers and fifty individual executives of 
folding carton manufacturers on one Sherman Act misdemeanor 
count which charged a conspiracy to fix prices from 1960 · to 
1974.18 R. Harper Brown, who at the time of the indictment was 
the President and Chief Operating Officer of the Container Cor-
poration of America, a major producer of folding cartons, 
pleaded nolo contendere, and the district court imposed a sen-
tence of fifteen days incarceration, a $15,000 fine, and a 
mandatory probation period. Brown completed his sentence and 
paid the fine. 17 
In addition to the indictment, the Department of Justice filed 
a civil action for alleged violations of the antitrust laws and the 
False Claims Act. 18 The civil action brought by the government 
and various treble-damage actions filed by private parties 
against the folding carton producers were consolidated. 19 After 
consolidation, the government facilitated discovery by granting 
immunity under federal immunity statutes20 to several depo-
nents who had invoked the Fifth Amendment. The government's 
civil action was settled and dismissed by stipulation. 21 
In his first deposition in the civil action before the district 
court, Brown provided only his name and address but refused to 
11 United States v. Consolidated Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1978). 
17 See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1979). 
1• United States v. Alton Box Board Co., No. 76-1638 (N.D. Ill., filed April 30, 1976). 
See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 609 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1979). 
11 See Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 869 (7th Cir. 1979). 
'" 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976). In 1970, Congress consolidated previous federal im-
munity statutes into the Federal Immunity of Witnesses Act. Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. II, § 201(a), 84 Stat. 926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
6001-6005 (1976)). The Supreme Court has recognized that immunity statutes are essen-
tial to the enforcement of criminal statutes, see, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 
(1906), and has observed that immunity has "become a part of our constitutional fabric." 
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956). The Court has also held that a grant 
of immunity allows the state to compel testimony. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441 (1972); the Supreme Court affirmed a district court order holding in contempt grand 
jury witnesses who refused to testify after immunity was granted. See also Gardner v. 
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (immunity is required to compel a police officer to testify 
before a grand jury investigating alleged bribery and corruption); Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (holding that a person may be held in civil contempt if he 
refuses to testify after a grant of immunity). 
" Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. at 622. 
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answer any additional questions on Fifth Amendment grounds. 
The private plaintiffs moved to compel the testimony of twenty-
one other witnesses who had refused to testify on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds. The district court granted the motion to compel 
the testimony of several witnesses in a pretrial order. The court 
then released a .subsequent order directing Brown to testify 
under a federal recalcitrant witness statute. 22 At the deposition 
held after the district court's order, Brown appeared for ques-
tioning, but refused to answer certain questions on the basis of 
an assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege. The district court 
granted plaintiffs' motion to hold Brown in contempt. 
On appeal, the issue was whether he could assert the privilege 
since immunity had never been granted and criminal prosecu-
tion remained possible. 23 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit held that Brown was protected under the 
Fifth Amendment. The division between the district and appel-
late courts in Folding Carton indicates judicial uncertainty 
about the proper standard for protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment in civil antitrust actions. 
ill. DEVELOPING THE PROPER FIFTH AMENDMENT STANDARD 
A. The "Reasonable Fear of Criminal Prosecution" Test 
The district court in Folding Carton held that a witness could 
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege only if he has a "reasona-
ble fear of prosecution. " 24 The essential element of the test is os-
tensibly an assessment of the risk that the witness faces: if the 
probability of prosecution is sufficiently high to give reasonable 
cause to fear prosecution, he may properly assert the privilege. 
The right to invoke the privilege, however, is not based solely on 
n Folding Carton, Pretrial Order No. 51 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1979) (order directing depo-
nent to testify). 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976) provides: 
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or 
grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with 
an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, 
paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court, upon such re-
fusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order 
his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to 
give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement 
shall exceed the life of -
(1) the court proceeding, or 
(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, before which refusal to 
comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall such confinement 
exceed eighteen months. 
" Folding Carton, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979). 
" Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. at 621. 
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the witness' own estimation of the risk of criminal prosecution. 
Rather, the court must determine whether the witness silence 
is justified based on the particular facts of the situation. Such a 
determination, however, requires a standard. The court applied 
a standard previously applied by the United States Supreme 
Court in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commiss.ion of Investiga-
tion, 25 a criminal case concerning organized crime, racketeering, 
and political corruption: "[i]t is well established that the privi-
lege [against self-incrimination] protects against real dangers, 
not remote and speculative possibilities."28 The question re-
mains, however, what constitutes a "real danger."27 In Folding 
Carton, the district court created its own calculus of risk. The 
threshold inquiry facing the court in such a calculus is whether 
the answer which would be given in the civil proceeding might 
indicate that the witness was involved in criminal activities. 28 
Second, the court must consider whether the answers which 
might indicate criminal involvement could expose the witness to 
any theoretically possible criminal prosecution.29 If some circum-
stance precludes criminal prosecution - such as the running' of 
the statute of limitations,30 a grant of immunity,31 or the pres-
" 406 U.S. 472 (1972). In Zicarelli, the Court carefully examined whether disclosure 
might expose the defendant to criminal liability under either domestic or foreign law 
before allowing him to be held in contempt after he asserted his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. In order to sustain the assertion, the Court has required that the question be evalu-
ated "in the setting in which it is asked." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 
(1951). See Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Melchor 
Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046-47, 1050 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976); Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. 
at 621. 
21 Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972) (footnote 
omitted). 
n For examples of the way various courts have determined whether "real danger" ex-
ists, see Priebe v. World Ventures, Inc,, 407 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1976), in which 
defendants in a civil action refused to answer oral depositions and written interrogatories. 
The court examined different expressions for the level of risk required and held that any 
conceivable danger is sufficient. 
20 Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. at 621. 
a Id.; Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 480 (1972); United 
States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
30 In United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256 (4th Cir.), vacated and rem'd on other 
grounds mem., 368 U.S. 14 (1961), the court held that a witness in a tax court proceeding 
could be compelled to testify if the statute of limitations precluded criminal prosecution. 
"(I]f by reason of the statute of limitations there remains no possibility that a prosecu-
tion of the witness may result from or be assisted by his answers to questions, he is not 
justified in refusing to answer." Id. at 259 (emphasis in original). See Hale v. Henkel, 201 
U.S. 43 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
st In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Court held that where a grant 
of immunity bars criminal prosecution, a grand jury witness may not invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. "If [the immunity granted] ... is coextensive with the scope of 
the privilege . . . , refusals to answer based on the privilege were unjustified, and the 
judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of immunity has removed the dangers 
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ence of double jeopardy32 - a witness may not assert the 
privilege. 
Third, the court must determine that the threat of an actual 
prosecution is not too remote or speculative a possibility. 33 The 
"reasonable fear of prosecution" test thus makes it incumbent 
upon the court to assess the possible behavior of various govern-
mental agencies charged with enforcing the antitrust laws. The 
test is clearly based on numerous factors which are subject to 
. wide variation and are inherently difficult to predict. 
The salient factors in Folding Carton were five-fold. First, the 
government had completed an exhaustive criminal prosecution.s. 
The complexity and interdependency of the action would have 
made it impractical for the government to divide its case and 
bring a subsequent and separate criminal action against each 
defendant. 35 
Second, although the statute of limitations on the original 
price-fixing suit had not completely run, there was "no indica-
tion that any federal prosecutorial authority has conducted, is 
conducting, or contemplates an investigation aimed towards pro-
ducing new indictments against any potential defendant in the 
folding carton industry. "38 The absence of a current or planned 
investigation apparently was sufficient for the district court to 
ignore the fact that legal liability was still possible. 
Third, the statute of limitations on criminal actions had run in 
most state jurisdictions. 37 In those states in which the statute 
had not yet run, the court found no indication of a planned crim-
against which the privilege protects." Id. at 449. See generally United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (Il), 590 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 
1979); In re Bonk, 527 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1975). 
oz The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall . . . be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. A conviction 
for the crime ends all liability to the state and any subsequent testimony which relates to 
the crime cannot tend to incriminate. "It is well established that once a witness has been 
convicted for the transactions in question, he is no longer able to claim the privilege of 
the Fifth Amendment and may be compelled to testify." United States v. Romero, 249 
F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1957). This exception is limited under federal antitrust prosecution 
because a violator can be criminally liable under both federal and state statutes for the 
same activity. "[A] federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of the 
same person for the same acts .... " United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317 
(1978). See notes 56-58 and accompanying, text infra. 
" Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. at 621. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra. 
" At the close of the criminal trial, the government stated that the "case involved the 
greatest number of defendants of any case in history which had ever been tried to a 
conclusion." United States v. Consolidated Packaging Corp., 575 F.2d 117, 119 n.1 (7th 
Cir. 1978) . 
., Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. 618, 622-23 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
" Id. at 622. 
" Id. 
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inal prosecution. Moreover, the court asserted that the likelihood 
that a state would have the resources, time, and interest to initi-
ate an investigation and prosecution to be "trifling" at best.38 
Fourth, the district court found that because five of the wit-
nesses had previously given immunized testimony before the fed-
eral grand jury which had returned the original indictments, the 
prosecution was probably unable to indict and convict them.39 
Although a grant of immunity under federal statutes does not 
confer transactional immunity40 and a person may still be prose-• 
cuted,41 courts have been careful to protect witnesses from im-
permissible "derivative use" of immunized testimony in subse-
quent prosecutions.42 A federal prosecutor would, therefore, be 
severely limited in his power to use testimony obtained in a pre-
vious civil proceeding. 
Fifth, the district court found that remedial action could mini-
'" Id. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), the Court stated that "[t]he 
central standard for the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is con-
fronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrim-
ination." Id. at 53. 
" Folding Carton, 46.5 F. Supp. at 622-23. 
40 Transactional immunity guarantees that a witness will be free from prosecution for 
any act discussed in the compelled testimony. Federal immunity statutes at one _time 
granted full transactional immunity. See, e.g., Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 
728, tit. II, § 201, 70 Stat. 574 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1406) (prior to 1970 repeal) which 
provided that "no ... witness shall be prosecuted or subject to any penalty or forfeiture 
for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, 
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evi-
dence .... " The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. II, § 
201(a), 84 Stat. 926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)), replaced transactional 
immunity with the narrower protection of use immunity. The use immunity proscribes 
the use or derivative use of the witness' compelled testimony; the government can still 
prosecute, but cannot use the testimony or any new evidence obtained from leads derived 
from the compelled testimony in a later prosecution. See note 42 and accompanying text 
infra. 
" See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); United States v. 
Thanasouras, 368 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 
" "[N]o testimony ... compelled under the order (or any information directly or indi-
rectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness 
in any criminal case .... " 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). In a later prosecution of a witness 
granted immunity, the government has the burden of proving "that the evidence it pro-
poses to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled 
testimony." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). See, e.g., United States 
v. Murzer, 534 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1976) (subsequent prosecution of an immunized 
grand jury witness for aiding and abetting the filing of fraudulent federal corporate in-
come tax returns); United States v. First Western State Bank, 491 F.2d 780 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974) (subsequent prosecution of an immunized grand jury 
witness for illegal campaign contributions); United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 
(8th Cir. 1973) (convictions for embezzlement and misapportionment of funds vacated 
because the prosecutor had seen defendant's immunized testimony); United States v. 
Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (indictments for fraud dismissed because the 
prosecutor read immunized testimony from bankruptcy proceedings). 
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mize the detrimental effect of incriminating testimony if a crimi-
nal prosecution were subsequently brought. The evidence could 
be suppressed in the criminal trial and could not be used di-
rectly in an ensuing criminal prosecution. The "use or derivative 
use of any incriminating testimony given in the compelled depo-
sition answers in a subsequent criminal proceeding would be im-
permissible."43 Moreover, the trial court asserted that it could 
place the deposition answers under seal until the time of trial 
and place them under protective order. 44 
Under the "reasonable fear" test, as applied in Folding Car-
ton, the completion of the massive criminal prosecution, the ab-
sence of any plans to investigate further, and the availability of 
remedial measures were sufficient to overcome the risk to the 
witness of self-incrimination and to override his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. 
B. The "Possibility of Criminal Prosecution" Test 
The determination of whether a defendant may be compelled 
to testify in a civil antitrust action does not necessarily require 
an assessment of the probability of prosecution. The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Folding Carton applied an alternate 
test: when the possibility of criminal prosecution exists, one may 
not compel testimony.45 To justify an assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege under this test, the witness need only es-
tablish that two conditions are present. First, the court must 
find that the answer to the deposition question might indicate 
that the deponent was involved in criminal activities. The pri-
mary requirement is that the answer actually tends to incrimi-
nate.48 Second, the court must find that a criminal prosecution is 
still possible.47 Once any risk at all of prosecution is established, 
a deponent who has not been granted immunity may invoke the 
privilege. 
Under this analysis, a careful weighing of risks, costs, and ben-
efits becomes unnecessary. Only if one can prove that the depo-
nent has a mere fanciful possibility of prosecution is an ijssertion 
of the privilege rejected under this test. 48 The burden, however, 
" Folding Carton, 465 F. Supp. at 624. 
" Id. at 624 n.5. 
" Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 871. 
" See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. 
n Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 871. 
" Id. ("only when there is but a fanciful possibility of prosecution that a claim of fifth 
amendment privilege is not well taken."); In re Brogna, 589 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(the issue is "whether there is a genuine rather than a spurious danger of self-incrimina-
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remains on the witness to show that he is still exposed to crimi-
nal prosecution.49 The constitutional right not to testify does not 
depend upon an uncertain and ambiguous judicial interpretation 
of the relative risk of criminal prosecution which the witness 
faces. 50 The "possibility of prosecution" test leaves the court a 
very limited degree of latitude. The test essentially demands 
th'at the court find a bar to subsequent prosecution in order to 
compel testimony after an assertion of Fifth Amendment 
privilege. 
Assessing the probability of prosecution ·under the "possibility 
of prosecution" test is far simpler than under the "reasonable 
fear" test. The central issue becomes whether the statute of limi-
tations,51 a grant of immunity,52 the prohibition against placing a 
person in double jeopardy,53 or another bar has precluded crimi-
nal antitrust prosecution.54 
The conclusion of a large criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion was not sufficient for the Seventh Circuit in Folding Carton 
to deny the deponent his Fifth Amendment privilege.55 Criminal 
liability could continue despite the conclusion of such an investi-
gation: First, a state indictment could be filed and could cover 
any activity which occurred within the applicable statute of lim-
itations.58 Since discrepancies exist among state statutes of limi-
tations,57 it may be a very long time before all possibility of lia-
tion"); In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[i]f the answers 
could possibly provide such a link [in the necessary chain of evidence], the witness may 
refuse to answer."); United States v. Seaver, 472 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1973) (the privi-
lege must be upheld if "the power ... to prosecute ... was not such an imaginary or 
unsubstantial contingency"); United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), 
vacated and rem'd on other grounds mem., 368 U.S. 14 (1961) (if ... there remains no 
possibility that a prosecution . . . could result . . . he is not justified in refusing to 
answer."). 
" "When a witness can demonstrate any possibility of prosecution which is more than 
fanciful he has demonstrated a reasonable fear of prosecution sufficient to meet constitu-
tional muster." Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 871. 
'° The right to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege "does not depend upon the likeli-
hood, but upon the possibility of prosecution." In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 
293 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original). 
" See note 30 and accompanying text supra. 
" See note 31 and accompanying text supra. 
53 See note 32 and accompanying text supra . 
.. Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 872. 
53 See generally id. at 870-72. 
51 A state statute may have a broader scope than federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., State 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 460, 484, 344 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1976), an antitrust action 
brought against an oil company for alleged price discrimination, in which the New York 
Court of Appeals accepted the argument that the state antitrust law, N.Y. GEN. Bus. 
LAw § 340 (McKinney 1968), had a wider sweep than the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(1976). 
" Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16755(b) (Deering Supp. 1979) (four years) with 
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bility ends. Second, other federal and state charges arising out of 
the same facts hut requiring an additional element of proof could 
be hrought. 58 Furthermore, federal prosecutors could use the evi~ 
dence to substantiate claims of a felony conspiracy or to bring a 
case concerning violations in product lines not included in the 
original indictment. 59 Third, tangential criminal charges which 
are ancillary to the main antitrust charge, e.g., mail fraud, could 
be brought.8° Finally, the absence of pending grand jury proceed-
ings does not foreclose the possibility of future prosecution. 81 A 
criminal action could still be brought, even though a grand jury 
is not yet formed or has been formed and dissolved. The past 
and present behavior of prosecutorial authorities is not a suffi-
ciently accurate indicator of the risk of criminal prosecution on 
which to base a decision to compel self-incriminating testimony 
under the "possibility of prosecution" test. 
IV. THE PROPER RULE. 
Compulsory full disclosure in civil antitrust discovery when 
immunity from criminal prosecution has not been granted is in-
imical to the constitutional right to remain silent. Alternatives 
to the· privilege against self-incrimination are unsatisfactory. 
Where statutory immunity is absent, the judiciary is unable to 
Cow. REV. STAT. § 6-4-104 (1979) (six years). See also IIL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-6(2) 
(1977) (four years); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 93, § 9 (Mitchie/Law. Co-op 1975) (the statute 
is governed by the general six year limitations provision, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 63 
(Mitchie/Law. Co-op 1975)); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.151 (1968) (the statute is governed 
by the general six year limitations provision, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.24 (1968)); N.Y. 
GEN. Bus. LAW § 341 (McKinney 1968) (three years); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.12 
(Page 1979) (no limitation); 'Tux. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 1533 (Vernon 1968) 
(the statue is governed by the general three year limitations provision, 'Tux. CRIM. PRO. 
CooE ANN. § 1201 (Vernon 1977)) . 
.. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), in which the Supreme Court 
held that a person may be convicted on three separate sections of federal law for a single 
sale of narcotics; United States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1971), in which the 
court held that a defendant who was convicted of conspiring to defraud in the sale of 
securities could be subsequently prosecuted for the substantive offenses relating to the 
same transaction; and United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), in which the 
court allowed defendants who had been convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice to 
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege because of the possibility of future prosecution for 
the substantive crime, But see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); 
United States v. Vaught, 434 F.2d 124, 125 (1970) (Ely, J., concurring) . 
.. Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 871. 
'° See United States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Miranti, 253 F.2d 13ij (2d Cir. 1958). 
11 Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 872 n.10; In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292, 293 
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958). 
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protect the witness from subsequent prosecution. If the possibil-
ity of prosecution remains, the Department of Justice policy and 
the double jeopardy provision afford the witness insufficient pro-
tection. Furthermore, adoption of an exclusionary rule would be 
an inadequate and unacceptable method of protecting the con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In the balance, 
then, the Fifth Amendment right should prevail if immunity is 
absent and prosecution is still possible. 
A. Absence of Immunity 
Congress adopted the federal immunity statutes to provide an 
acceptable method to compel desired but possibly incriminating 
testimony by proscribing its subsequent use against the wit-
ness. 82 The decision whether to grant immunity thus obviously 
depends on the value of the desired testimony.83 A court's deci-
sion to demand testimony and then protect it under the "reason-
able fear" test does not reflect a balancing of the public need for 
the testimony against the social cost of precluding the use of the 
testimony against the witness. Even if the court had discretion 
to protect a witness, which it does not,84 under the "reasonable 
fear" test the court weighs the needs of the private plaintiffs for 
civil discovery against the probability of subsequent criminal 
prosecution. These are not the proper interests and considera-
tions to weigh. 
Furthermore, the decision to compel testimony despite the ab-
12 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Note, "The Public Has a Claim 
to Every Man's Evidence": The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 
30 STAN. L. REv. 1211 (1978). 
13 In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1977). The court stated: 
[o)nce the bar of the privilege against self-incrimination has been raised by the 
witness, the decision whether to confer immunity in order to facilitate the gov-
ernment's investigation is the product of the balancing of the public need for the 
particular testimony or documentary information in question against the social 
cost of granting immunity and thereby precluding the possibility of criminally 
prosecuting an individual who has violated the criminal law. 
" The power to grant immunity is not within the purview of a court; it is an executive 
function. This is appropriate because the prosecutor is in a better position to assess the 
relative benefits of immunized testimony and the need to prosecute. Thus, the decision 
to grant immunity to a witness is best left to the prosecutor. "[T]he relative importance 
of particular testimony to federal law enforcement interests is a judgmental rather than a 
legal determination, one remaining wholly within the competence of appropriate execu-
tive officials .... "In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 1977). See Ryan v. Comm'r, 
568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 
1969). The judicial decision to compel testimony under the "reasonable fear of criminal 
prosecution" test would reflect an analysis inconsistent with the criteria and principles 
appropriately used by prosecutorial agencies to determine whether to compel testimony 
through a grant of immunity from prosecution. 
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sence of immunity generally reflects the supposition that no use 
could be made of the compelled deposition testimony against the 
deponent in a criminal prosecution. While language in previous 
cases exists to support that. position, 65 the principle espoused in 
those cases is nothing more than an application of the exclusion-
ary rule against evidentiary use of information obtained in viola-
tion of a defendant's constitutional rights. The language in the 
cases and the exclusionary rule, however, clearly reflect the prin-
ciple that evidence which stems from judicial error in applica-
tion of the Fifth Amendment will be suppressed.66 The principle 
is solely ameliorative, however, and is designed only to rectify 
nunc pro tune a constitutional violation already committed.67 
B. The Possibility of Prosecution 
In Hoffman u. United States, 68 the United States Supreme 
Court stated that to deny the Fifth Amendment privilege to a 
witness, it must be ''perfectly clear, from a careful consideration 
of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness who as-
serted the privilege is mistaken, and that the answer cannot pos-
sibly have such tendency to incriminate."69 If criminal prosecu-
tion under the criminal antitrust statutes is legally possible, an 
individual should fall within the privilege. The "possibility of 
criminal prosecution" test in antitrust actions thus comports 
with the requirements of Hoffman. 
The fact that the Department of Justice has already prose-
cuted an individual for a particular substantive crime provides 
scant protection from further prosecution.70 Because the Depart-
15 Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 474-75 (1975) (White, J., concurring); Adams v. 
Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954). See also The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAav. 
L. REV. 63, 221-22 (1968). 
11 In Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), the Court held that a lawyer is not subject 
t.o a contempt penalty for advising his client, during the trial of a civil case, to assert a 
Fifth Amendment privilege when he believed in good faith that the evidence might tend 
t.o incriminate his client. The Court concluded that suppression of the evidence in a sub-
sequent criminal trial would provide inadequate protection of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege. Id. at 461-62. ' 
Furthermore, the legal authority for such an exclusionary rule is predicated upon the 
assumption that it applies to judicial errors and not to systematic attempts to compel 
testimony. See id. at 474 (White, J., concurring). See also Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 
179, 181 (1954). 
" See Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 872 n.11. See also notes 74-84 and accompanying 
text infra. 
" 341 U.S. 479 (1951). 
" Id. at 486-87. 
" Fifth Amendment protection should remain intact because subsequent criminal 
prosecutions may occur, despite a government policy of avoiding multiple actions against 
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ment's policy can be changed with executive discretion not sub-
ject to judicial review,71 its present policy of avoiding sequential 
prosecutions of the same individual is not a sufficient safeguard 
for an individual already convicted of a substantive crime who is 
then called to testify further about the same transaction. The 
status of current criminal prosecutions and plans to prosecute 
should not affect the decision whether to compel self-incriminat-
ing testimony. 
Furthermore, the principle of double jeopardy does not prevent 
a first prosecution for the substantive offense and a subsequent 
prosecution for conspiracy to commit the substantive offense.72 
The existence of a multiplicity of closely related federal and 
state crimes stemming from the same set of circumstances also 
diminishes the protection of the double jeopardy principle. For 
example, an individual could be prosecuted in a series of trials 
which concerned different product lines.73 As a result, an individ-
ual should be afforded the Fifth Amendment privilege even 
though a prosecution has been completed. The possibility that 
disclosure could be incriminating and that prosecution may yet 
occur should be sufficient to allow invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
C. The Exclusionary Rule 
As an alternative to giving a witness in a civil suit who faces 
possible .criminal prosecution the full privilege, a court might 
compel the testimony but adopt an exclusionary rule, which 
would require the exclusion of the testimonial evidence in any 
subsequent criminal prosecution. This proposal, however, would 
be inadequate and unacceptable. 
First, as the Seventh Circuit in Folding Carton recognized, ex-
the same individual. See United States v. Leviton Mfg. Co., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 45,077 (D. Conn. 1978) and United States v. Electric Fuse 
Mfrs. Guild, [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) iJ 45,078 (D. Mass. 
1978), which concern the consecutive prosecutions of George Byrne, who is currently 
under yet another inv,estigation. Arn. Metal Market, May 21, 1979, at 1, col. 3. 
71 United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d 1159, 1164 (2d Cir. 1971) (Oakes, J., concurring). 
The government has the power to try several offenses which arise out of the same trans-
action, but it is not compelled to do so because of departmental policies. See Petite v. 
United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th 
Cir. 1970) . 
. ,, See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973}; United 
States v. Fishbein, 446 F.2d 1201, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1971}; United States v. Chase, 281 
F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1958); 
United States v. Ward, 314 F. Supp. 261, 263 (E.D. La. 1970) .. 
73 See note 59 and accompanying text supra. 
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clusion of the tainted evidence does not rectify the initial viola-
tion: "[t]he exclusionary rule is solely remedial and cannot be 
used as a rationale to support a judicial decision which contra-
venes the fifth amendment's protection."7' The American judici-
ary should not adopt a policy which, in effect, deliberately vio-
lates an individual's constitutional rights and then promises · 
simply that the worst aspect of the violation, the possibility that 
a criminal prosecution will be based on the evidence derived, 
will be subsequently prevented.75 Such a policy would essentially 
have the courts condone and participate in the violation of con-
stitutional rights, a rather anamolous and disconcerting result. 78 
Second, a policy which allows compulsory testimony in the 
civil antitrust litigation and adopts an exclusionary rule for 
criminal proceedings eviscerates the central value of the privi-
lege to the individual. The purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to 
ensure that an individual would not be required to produce evi-
dence for the governmental machinery which is used to enforce 
federal criminal antitrust laws against him.77 Assurances that the 
" Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 872 n.11. 
75 Systematic violation of the privilege against self-incrimination presents both the in-
dividual and society with an unacceptable policy. In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 
U.S. 52 (1964), the Court summarized the policy of the privilege: 
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in the 
development of our liberty - 'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to 
make himself civilized.' " It reflects many of our fundamental values and most 
noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the 
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an ac-
cusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that 
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and 
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by 
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown 
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the indi-
vidual to shoulder the entire load"; our respect for the inviolability of human 
personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he 
may lead a private life"; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our 
realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often 
"a protection to the innocent." 
Id. at 55 (citations omitted). See E. Gmswow, THE FIYm AMENDMENT TODAY 7-9, 61, 75 
(1955). . 
71 This argument necessarily assumes either that the act of compulsion itself is prohib-
ited, see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), or that evidence from the com-
pelled testimony will be used in some way by the prosecutor. See text accompanying 
notes 82-84 infra. 
Active participation by the courts in compelling a person to testify against himself 
undermines the integrity of the judicial system. In Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), 
which concerned a violation of a state securities law, the Court asserted that "the basic 
purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protect-
ing the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial 
system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution 'shoulder 
the entire load.'" Id. at 415. 
71 See note 14 and accompanying text supra. 
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specific testimony being compelled in a civil trial will not be 
used in subsequent criminal proceedings is not a sufficient pro-
tection. The individual is still compelled to testify publicly as to 
his criminal activities. 
Third, as a practical matter, the adoption of a federal rule of 
criminal procedure which excluded self-incriminating evidence 
compelled in a civil antitrust trial would be an inferior substi-
tute for the broad scope of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The most difficult practical problem is the multiplicity of 
antitrust statutes under which a violator may be prosecuted.78 
The national scope of American business and the attendant na-
tional scope of the effects of antitrust violations mean that an 
individual violator may be subject to criminal prosecution in nu-
merous state jurisdictions.78 Adoption of a federal exclusionary 
rule might ameliorate the problems of admissions of evidence in 
federal court, but would not provide protection from actions in 
state courts under state antitrust laws. In Folding Carton, the 
Seventh Circuit emphasized that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
had to be upheld since the statute of limitations had not run in 
all states.80 A similar argument could be made if the proposed 
exclusionary rule were not adopted in all jurisdictions. 81 
Finally, even if the evidence compelled in a civil action could 
be fully excluded from subsequent prosecutions based on that 
evidence, it would still be known to criminal prosecutors. 
Though the testimony itself would be inadmissible, knowledge of 
the testimony might prove to be very useful to the government. 
In tangentially related criminal antitrust proceedings, such as 
crimes of conspiracy and mail fraud, 82 the compelled testimony 
from the civil proceeding may provide fresh ideas, theories, or 
starting points for the prosecution. 83 The only recourse after tes-
" See notes 6-9 and accompanying text supra. 
71 See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. 
"° Folding Carton, 609 F.2d at 871 & 871 n.8. 
" Unlike a grant of statutory immunity which precludes prosecution in all jurisdic-
tions, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964), a federal exclusionary 
rule would not apply to the states and would create an untenable trilemma for the civil 
antitrust defendant: to refuse to testify and face sanctions for contempt, to commit per-
jury, or to testify and risk providing self-incriminating evidence in subsequent criminal 
antitrust prosecutions at the state level. 
112 See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra. 
,. In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950), which concerned a witness' assertion 
of the privilege before a grand jury, the Court recognized the risk of providing criminal 
prosecutors with leads: 
Whether such admissions by themselves would support a conviction under a 
criminal statute is immaterial. Answers to the questions asked by the grand jury 
would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of 
petitioner . . . . Prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under 
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timony has been wrongfully compelled is to suppress any evi-
dence which stems from the violation. 84 
CONCLUSION 
The manifold increase in civil and criminal antitrust proceed-
ings instituted today has escalated the level of problems and un-
certainty with which antitrust violators must cope. But constitu-
tional rights must be protected. The Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination has been a particularly troublesome 
area in which ambiguity should not be tolerated. Once a civil 
antitrust proceeding has been initiated, the possibility of crimi-
nal liability remains until a legal bar - the statute of limita-
tions, a grant of immunity, or double jeopardy - has arisen. In 
order to ensure that an individual receives complete protection 
of his constitutional rights, it is imperative that he not be com-
pelled to testify against himself if the possibility of criminal 
prosecution remains. The constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination should not depend upon a trial court's calculus of 
the risk of criminal proceedings, since the court cannot be sure 
that prosecution will not occur until an absolute bar has been 
imposed. Moreover, the court probably cannot completely pre-
vent the subsequent use of the compelled testimony under cur-
rent law. The best response is simply to allow the defendant to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in the civil suit. Tinkering 
with the rules of criminal procedure would be, at best, an incom-
plete and unsatisfactory response. The privilege against self-in-
crimination requires vigilant and careful protection; the vindica-
tion of constitutional rights deserves no less. 
-David D. Gregg 
such circumstances, the Constitution gives a witness the privilege of remaining 
silent. 
Id. at 161. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Tug Kate Mulloy, 291 F. Supp. 816, 818 (E.D. La. 
1968); In re Commonwealth Financial Corp., 288 F. Supp. 786, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 
408 F.2d 640 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). 
"' In Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), a prosecutor attempted to subpoena 
materials in a civil proceeding which might have been used in a criminal prosecution. The 
Court observed: 
[T)he City Attorney argued that if petitioner's client produced the magazines he 
was amply protected because in any ensuing criminal action he could always move. 
to suppress, or object on Fifth Amendment grounds to the introduction of the 
magazines into evidence. Laying to one side possible waiver problems that might 
arise if the witness followed that course, cf. Rogers u. United States, 340 U.S. 367 
(1951), we nevertheless cannot conclude that it would afford adequate protection. 
Without something more "he would be compelled to surrender the very protection 
which the privilege is designed to guarantee." 
Id. at 461-62 (footnotes omitted). 

